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Abstract 
Climate change is one of the most challenging topics to the 
world and has been subject to international negotiations for 
more than 25 years, one of the main players being the USA. 
Game theory, on the other hand, is a popular tool from 
economics, frequently used to analyze strategic situations such 
as international negotiations. Together, the insights from these 
topics can help understand why the USA’s president Donald 
Trump has announced to quit the Paris Agreement and which 
consequences this might have for the US, other countries and 
for the future of international climate change negotiations. In 
order to assess the different implications, this thesis gives some 
theoretical background and presents game theoretic findings on 
climate change negotiations. It will be found that, from a game 
theoretic point of view, different reasons might have caused the 
USA to take this decision and that there is a chance that a 
withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement could have 
some effect on the future of climate protection. However, a 
precise assessment would require further research on the topic.
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Exposé 
Relevance and goals 
In today's and the last decades' international negotiations, climate change has 
always been amongst the most discussed topics. Apart from being affected by 
uncertainties and unpredictabilities concerning the impacts of today's climate-
related decisions and behavior as well as the timely manner in which they will 
be noticeable, climate change negotiations are subject to numerous strategic 
challenges, as are all negotiations on common resources. 
Having experienced a long history of conferences, debates and non-binding 
commitments, it is widely believed that climate change negotiations have come 
to a breakthrough through COP21, which took place in Paris in December 2015. 
However, the success of this accord is severely being put into question since 
the USA's president's statement from 1st June 2017, when Trump announced 
the USA's withdrawal from the agreement. 
Considering the latter, this thesis aims to analyze the given situation and the 
strategic implications for the concerned parties and the future of climate 
protection, using basic game theoretic models and answering the following key 
questions: 
Key questions 
- What has COP21 achieved and what has still to be improved in 
international climate change negotiations? 
- Which role does the US play in climate change and international climate 
change negotiations? 
- How can game theory help understand and improve international climate 
change negotiations? 
- How can game theory explain Trump’s decision to quit the Paris 
Agreement and the consequences for the countries and future climate 
change negotiations? 
 Exposé 
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Methodology 
 
In order to answer these questions, the first part of this thesis will provide the 
reader with some theoretical background information on the history of climate 
change negotiations until COP 21, the role of the USA in climate change and 
climate change negotiations and an introduction to game theory. In a second 
step, a broad review of game theoretic applications to the issue of international 
climate change negotiations will allow the reader to gain an understanding of 
how game theory can explain and even help to optimize strategic situations. 
The third part of the thesis will reunite the findings of the previous chapters in 
order to analyze the reasons why the USA might decide to quit the Paris 
Agreement and which consequences it could have. The last chapter will give an 
overall conclusion and present an outlook on further research that could be 
relevant to this topic. 
Limits 
Apart from the fact that game theory is only one tool to look at strategic 
situations, one of the major constraints when using game theoretic models is 
that on the one hand, it is desirable to include as many variables as possible in 
the models for the outcome to get as close to reality as possible. However, on 
the other hand, models should still be simple and clear enough to be solvable. 
Another essential limit of game theory and therefore also this thesis is that 
game theory assumes certain conditions, such as the rationality and intelligence 
of the involved parties. Even though in international climate change negotiations 
the main players are countries or country unions, they are still represented by 
International Climate Change Negotiations Theoretical Background 
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individuals that have their own interests and opinions in mind and therefore 
might not always take rational and long term oriented decisions. 
Thus, the intention of this thesis is not to build a detailed and sophisticated 
game theoretic model and predict future actions and developments in climate 
change negotiations, but rather to give an overview of different game theoretic 
approaches that can be used to comprehend and analyze the given situation.
Theoretical Background 
Chapter Outlook: The following chapter will give some 
background information on three topics relevant to this thesis. 
First of all, a historic overview of the history of international 
climate change negotiations until COP 21 will be given, followed 
by a presentation of the USA’s position in climate change and 
climate change negotiations. Finally, an introduction to game 
theory will provide the reader with some basic concepts in order 
to allow him understand further game theoretic models. 
1. International Climate Change Negotiations 
1.1. History of International Climate Change Negotiations 
1.1.1. Early History 
After climatology had experienced a shift from being a descriptive to being a 
physical science due to five major developments in science, technology and 
geopolitics during the 1950s1, the new opportunities for monitoring, predicting 
and even controlling climatic and weather developments provided to the WMO 
World Weather Watch (WWW) and the WMO/ICSU Global Atmospheric 
Research Programme (GARP)2 soon raised concern that the rising 
concentrations of carbon dioxide in the earth’s atmosphere could already have 
begun affecting climate developments3. 
                                            
1
 Flohn (1970), pp. 223-229 
2
 Davies (1990) 
3
 SMIC (1971) 
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Contrary opinions on climate change, ranging from global warming to global 
cooling, drew the UN’s attention to the topic. In order to find out more about 
climate change and its consequences, the UN entrusted the WMO with a study 
of climate change which was executed by an Executive Committee Panel of 
Experts that came to the conclusion that greenhouse warming could be 
expected.4 These findings encouraged the WMO to arrange the first World 
Climate Conference in Geneva in 1979 in collaboration with the UNESCO, the 
WHO, ICSU and other partners with various scientific backgrounds, such as 
agriculture, water resources, environment, ecology or economics5. Still it took 
further conferences in Villach, Toronto, Hague, Noordwijk and Geneva and the 
first assessment report of the IPCC, the discovery of the stratospheric ozone 
hole and the publication of the Brundtland Commission report “Our Common 
Future” until international political action was taken for the first time in 1992, 
when the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) with currently 197 participating parties, 157 of them having ratified 
the convention6, was adopted7. 
1.1.2. Times of the Kyoto Protocol 
The UNFCCC’s goal is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the earth’s 
atmosphere. After it had entered into force in 1994, the first attempt to agree 
upon legally binding targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions was made 
during the third Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in Kyoto, 
Japan, in December 1997, where ministers from 170 countries around the globe 
met and negotiated with the aim to make a first step towards more profound, 
stricter and international emission reduction commitments. The result of the 
conference was the Kyoto Protocol, which divided the participating countries 
into different groups and followed the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities”. This means that even though all nations have the responsibility 
to work against climate change, industrialized nations, as they are bearing 
historical responsibility, should demonstrate leadership in addressing climate 
issues. Therefore, the Kyoto Protocol ought the Annex I countries to reduce 
                                            
4
 Gibbs et al. (1977), pp. 50-55 
5
 White (1979) 
6
 UNFCCC, official website 
7
 WMO, official website 
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their emissions of the six major greenhouse gases, namely carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), measured in the 
respective CO2 equivalent8, by 5.2% in the period from 2008 to 2012, baseline 
level being 1990, while no legally binding mitigation targets were opposed on 
developing countries.9 
As the USA considered the developing countries’ special status to be unfair, the 
country withdrew, which made the European Union the main player for pushing 
the negotiations forward. However, in 1992, US President George H. W. Bush 
signed “hesitatingly and under pressure”10 the UNFCCC, followed by President 
Clinton, who stated that the US would only agree upon binding emission 
reductions for developed countries if developing nations like India and China 
also took on responsibility and accepted binding commitments as well. 
Meanwhile, the EU aimed for an extensive accord including wide-ranging 
domestic action for Annex I nations without the flexibility mechanisms emissions 
trading, joint implementation and the clean development mechanism in order to 
reach a 15% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.11 
Even though the US refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and excluded itself from 
climate change negotiations as much as possible under the George W. Bush 
administration, the Kyoto Protocol still entered into force on 16 February 2005 
when Russia ratified it and the accord met the requirement of a total ratification 
by countries representing 55% of global emissions.12 
Two years later, in 2007, COP 13 and CMP 3 in Bali, Indonesia, took a new 
direction as for the first time, long-term issues were addressed. Finally, the Bali 
Action Plan and the Bali Roadmap were adopted. These should improve the 
negotiation process by separating two different working groups. 13 The first one, 
the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) had already been established in Montreal during 
the CMP 1 with reference to the protocol’s Article 3.9, which requires further 
                                            
8
 For previous section see: UNFCCC, official website, Kyoto Protocol 
9
 Bodansky (2001), pp. 23-39 
10
 Roberts (2011) 
11
 For previous section see: Hepburn (2007), pp. 375-394 
12
 The Guardian (2015a) 
13
 Ott (2008), pp. 91-95 
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commitments of Annex I countries at least seven years before the end of the 
commitment period.   
The second one, the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention (AWG-LCA) was newly established in Bali, having a focus 
on key elements of long-term cooperation, for instance mitigation, adaptation, 
finance, technology, and a shared vision for long-term cooperative action.14 
1.1.3. Negotiations on a successor for the Kyoto Protocol 
The COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009 was widely conceived as a potential 
milestone in the history of international climate change negotiations and high 
expectations were raised as it was the deadline for agreeing upon a successor 
treaty to Kyoto. Apart from the hope for fundamental progress in the 
negotiations, which had been lacking the years before, the presidency of Barack 
Obama gave cause for optimism in terms of the USA’s constructiveness and 
involvement. However, even though the US did indeed take a new course of 
action and actively participated in the Copenhagen negotiations, the resultant 
Copenhagen Accord was widely criticized and even perceived as a failure 
because goals were not achieved.15  
Besides the fact that there was no consensus regarding a successor treaty to 
the Kyoto Protocol, the new Accord proposed a system of voluntary emission 
reductions instead of legally binding commitments, which led to tremendous 
criticism. In addition, many of the nations taking part and observers felt that the 
negotiation process was neither democratic nor transparent as the final 
decisions were taken spontaneously between the USA, Brazil, South Africa, 
India and China (BASIC) without including other parties such as the EU that 
was until then the driving force in international climate change negotiations. 
Therefore, the excluded party rather took note of the Copenhagen Accord than 
adopting it the way it had been done with the Kyoto Protocol.16 Particular 
criticism was focusing on the fact that the two largest greenhouse gas emitting 
nations, China and the US with its additional historical responsibility, had not 
managed to set a good example and lead the negotiations together with all the 
                                            
14
 UNFCCC, official website: Home 
15
 For previous section see: BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8426835.stm 
16
 For previous section see: The Guardian (2009) 
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other participating nations towards a democratic and trendsetting multilateral 
agreement.17 
In Cancun, Mexico, the next set of negotiations took place in December 2010 
during the COP 16. Subsequent to the rather disappointing results of the 
Copenhagen Conference, expectations towards the summit were not 
particularly high. On the one hand, there was no success in finding a consensus 
on legally binding emission cuts. Furthermore, many important decisions had 
been delayed to the next round of conferences in Durban. Therefore, the 
outcomes of the Cancun negotiations were often described as a “weak deal”. 18  
Nevertheless, progress could be observed in terms of how negotiations were 
held in comparison to the previous ones in Copenhagen, as dialogue between 
all parties was encouraged and transparency was kept up. Additionally, 
essential decisions had been taken, including the official recognition of the 
necessity to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius, providing assistance to 
developing nations in coping with climate change issues and launching several 
new bodies and processes. The latter comprise the Green Climate Fund which 
was meant to function as the operating unit of the Convention’s financials, the 
Technology Mechanism which is divided into the Technology Executive 
Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network and aims to 
enhance climate technology development and transferring it to developing 
nations19, and the Cancun Adaptation Framework, stating that adaptation and 
mitigation should be addressed at the same priority level.20 
During the following years’ COPs in Durban, Doha, Warsaw and Lima, a 
rulebook for the emission reduction from deforestation and degradation is 
finalized, a mechanism to cope with destructions from climate change is 
produced and the parties committed to elaborating a new universal climate 
change agreement by 2015.21  
 
                                            
17
 Bodansky (2001), pp. 23-39 
18
 The Guardian (2010) 
19
 For previous section see: UNFCCC, official website, Technology Mechanism 
20
 UNFCCC, official website, Timeline 
21
 UNFCCC, official website, Timeline 
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1.2. COP 21 
COP 21 that was held in Paris from 30 November to 11 December 2015 is 
widely perceived as a huge success as for the first time in the history of climate 
change negotiations, all countries in the world except for two managed to agree 
on a set of actions to tackle global warming and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.22 The main elements of the accord include holding global warming 
compared to pre-industrialized levels at “well below” 2°C, preferably limiting 
temperature rise to 1.5°C. In order to achieve this, the agreement aims to 
decrease greenhouse gas emissions to the level that can be naturally absorbed, 
for instance through trees and soil, within the second half of the 21st century. To 
keep countries on track, a pledge and review system is established that 
requires the parties to make new pledges in five year intervals and reviews the 
countries’ proceedings. Additionally, industrial countries shall support 
developing nations through the provision of financial means, technologies and 
capacity-building.23 
However, Rogelj et al. analyzed the effectivity of the countries’ INDCs and came 
to the conclusion that, even though minimizing greenhouse gas emissions, 
these individual contributions would collectively still lead to a global warming of 
2.6°C to 3.1°C by the end of the 21st century. Even though this assessment 
does not take into account a gradual strengthening of scope and ambition of the 
INDCs, the researchers found that meeting the goal to hold global warming 
below 2°C would require action not only from the states but also from sub-
national and other institutions.24 
Bodansky on the other hand points out that the Paris Agreement can neither be 
perceived as a success for its content, nor for the sufficiency of the parties’ start 
off pledges. However, it might be justifiable calling the Paris accord a success if 
in the future it turns out to call up global action against temperature rise. Eight 
positive features of the agreement being pointed out include that it is in some 
areas legally binding, that in contrast to Kyoto the Paris Agreement is global, in 
that its requirements are not limited to industrial countries and that it stipulates 
some central obligations for all countries, which takes into consideration that a 
                                            
22
 BBC (2017) 
23
 For previous section see: United Nations (2015) 
24
 For previous section see: Rogelj et al. (2016) 
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countries capacity and situation can change over time. In addition, the accord is 
considered to be constructed in a durable and continuous way as it involves 
making pledges repeatedly with increased commitment, which might lead to 
increasingly tougher actions against global warming. Finally, the agreement 
managed to achieve almost universal recognition and acceptance and led to 
something comparable to peer pressure through the increased transparency 
and accountability levels. For this reason, Bodansky concludes that it is not yet 
assessable whether the Paris accord will turn out to be as successful as 
sometimes suggested by the media. Yet, if it does, it will probably be based on 
the fact that it fosters awareness and hence encourages further negotiations.25 
 
2. USA in Climate Change and Climate Change 
Negotiations 
2.1. USA’s Contribution to Climate Change 
A country’s contribution to climate change can be assessed in different ways. 
The results can differ dramatically depending on the approach being chosen 
and factors such as the comparison period, variables considered and 
comparison unit. Some approaches are applied to the USA in the following. 
2.1.1. Total Emissions Approach 
In 2016, the USA were the second largest producer of carbon dioxide emissions 
with 15.99% of total emissions, following China with 28.21% and contributing 
more than twice as much to global emissions than the third ranked nation 
India.26 However, one essential point in climate change negotiations is to what 
extent developed countries bear more responsibility for global warming due to 
historic emissions than developing nations. Additionally, it has to be pointed out 
that direct carbon emissions are not the only driver of global warming. Other 
drivers include carbon dioxide emissions caused by changes in land use, such 
as agriculture and deforestation, greenhouse gas emissions other than carbon 
dioxide, for example methane, emissions that have a contrary effect on the 
climate such as sulfate aerosols and their durability in the atmosphere. Table 1 
                                            
25
 For previous section see: Bodansky (2016) 
26
 Germanwatch (2017b) 
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illustrates an estimate of the 20 countries with the highest contributions to global 
warming, values being given in °C of global temperature change, and a 
breakdown of their contributions’ origins.27 
 
Table 1: Top 20 Contributors to Global Temperature Change28 
 
Even though China emitted almost twice as much carbon dioxide in 2016 as the 
USA, the table suggests that historically, the US is the uncontested leader in 
terms of contributions to global temperature change. This is mainly due to the 
highest fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions, contributing to global warming with 
0.143°C. Even though the additional carbon emissions from land use are not as 
high as for China and Brazil, the value is still comparatively high, leading to a 
contribution of 0.170°C from carbon emissions. Additionally, the US is the 
second largest emitter of other greenhouse gases and aerosols, the latter 
offsetting 0.063°C of the greenhouse gas emissions. 
2.1.2. Geographic Approach 
Still, it can be argued that comparing countries’ emissions based on their total 
emissions might not be a suitable approach as this might disadvantage big 
countries. Another way to look at a country’s contribution to temperature rise is 
by making the connection to its geographic size. Figure 1: Cartogram of 
National Climate Contributions, Density-Equalized Map shows a density-
                                            
27
 For previous section see: Matthews et al. (2014) 
28
 Matthews et al. (2014) 
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equalized map of the countries’ climate change contributions, signifying that the 
size of each country is proportionate to its contribution. Additionally, the color 
indicates the factor by which the size of the country has been increased or 
decreased. For example, the dark red color of Germany shows that the size of 
the country has been increased by a factor of 22 in order to make its displayed 
size proportionate to its contributions, whereas regions in light grey have been 
decreased compared to their actual size. The map implies that, relative to its 
geographic area, the USA has higher contributions to temperature change than 
China or Brazil, but less contribution per square kilometer than Germany, the 
UK or France for example. The indication is that the USA, historically 
contributing more to climate change than the EU, is more than twice as big as 
the EU and therefore has a significantly lower contribution per geographic unit. 
Remarkable is also the fact that Russia’s size has been expanded by less than 
one. This is due to the fact that Russia in terms of its size is by far the biggest 
country in the world. Therefore, the total emissions are distributed over a 
relatively vast surface. 
 
Figure 1: Cartogram of National Climate Contributions, Density-Equalized 
Map29 
 
                                            
29
 Matthews et al. (2014) 
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2.1.3. Per Capita Approach 
The approach most often used in comparable studies is the per capita 
approach. Figure 2 indicates the national contributions to climate change as per 
capita values. Orange and red fillings indicate per capita contributions above 
0.11°C per one billion people, which was the estimated average value in 2005. 
Countries with lower values are displayed in yellow and green. As can be seen, 
with this approach, fewer countries in the EU have per capita values 
significantly above average than with the geographic approach. Still, the EU 
was amongst the above average contributors. In comparison to the geographic 
approach, Russia is amongst the top five contributors in terms of per capita 
contributions, due to the fact that this time, the relatively high contributions are 
distributed over a moderate number of citizens. 
 
Figure 2: National Per Capita Contributions to Climate Warming30 
 
Table 2 compares the top 20 contributors in terms of total contributions to the 
same countries ranked according to their per capita contributions. Surprisingly, 
the results are partly differing significantly. While China and India are the 
second and fifth largest contributors to climate change in total contributions, 
they are ranked last in terms of its per capita emissions among the 20 countries. 
Other nations such as the Netherlands or Australia that are at the lower end of 
the 20 largest contributors are ranked considerably higher with regards to their 
                                            
30
 Matthews et al. (2014) 
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per capita contributions. The USA, which is by far the biggest contributor in 
total, is ranked second in per capita measurement behind the UK, which was 
formerly placed 7th.  
 
Table 2: Total Versus Per Capita Contributions to Temperature Change for 
the World's Top 20 Total Emitters31 
 
It can be concluded that no matter the approach chosen, the US is always 
amongst the top contributors. For it was the second largest emitter of carbon 
dioxide in 2016 and historically even the largest contributor to climate change, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that the USA’s actions against climate change 
could make a huge difference to the success of global actions. Additionally, the 
fact that it is ranked second for its per capita contributions raises the 
assumption that there absolutely is potential for the US to make significant 
contributions to climate protection. 
2.2. USA’s Performance in Tackling Climate Change 
According to the Climate Change Performance Index 2017 by Germanwatch, 
the US has been downgraded in the overall ranking by eight positions 
compared to the previous year to position 43 out of 58 assessed countries with 
                                            
31
 Matthews et al. (2014) 
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the rating “poor”. It has to be mentioned that the best rating, “very good”, and 
the first three ranks were not assigned to any country, because the researchers 
did not consider the achievements of any nation to be sufficient to deserve a top 
three ranking. 
The rating takes into account emissions levels weighted with 30%, the 
development of emissions, also with 30%, the countries’ climate policies with 
20% as well as renewable energies and efficiency with 10%, respectively. The 
nation has lost ranks in almost all categories, although per capita emissions 
have been falling since 2007, except for one year.  
With regards to total greenhouse gas emissions levels, the USA was rated as 
very poor as could be expected. Other countries with this rating include 
Canada, Russia, Australia and Korea. Experts point out that a crucial factor 
hindering the USA’s greenhouse gas emissions from decreasing are the 
currently rising methane emissions from shale gas extraction, which replaces 
the extraction of coal gas. The advice is to limit these in the future. 
Nevertheless, the US earned a moderate rating for its development of 
emissions and therewith surpasses big parts of South America and Asia, as well 
as some European countries like Germany, Norway and Poland.  
Also regarding renewable energies, the country achieved a moderate rating, so 
did China and India amongst others, while for example Russia, Mexico, 
Australia and Canada were rated as poor to very poor.  
The efficiency assessment, which takes into account the carbon intensity of a 
country’s primary energy supply and the country’s economy’s energy intensity, 
rated the USA’s efficiency as poor. The same applies to Brazil, Germany and 
India for example. Other countries, including Canada, Australia and Russia 
were rated even worse, while Argentina, Indonesia, France and most other 
European countries were rated moderate or better.  
Concerning the climate policy variable, it is stated that on the one hand, under 
Obama’s administration, the USA held a central role in international climate 
change negotiations, for instance by pushing agreements forward and involving 
other important countries like China and India. On the other hand, the country’s 
climate policy is criticized for the insufficient support in the loss and damage 
question during the COP21 negotiations. Furthermore, the study highlights that 
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the USA’s next years’ climate policy in severely endangered due to Trump’s 
election in November 2016. Therefore, the nation was rated moderate, so were 
Brazil, Canada and Russia amongst others. A few countries were rated good, 
including India, Sweden and Germany and last year’s leader, China, was 
replaced by Morocco. This part of the assessment allows poorly rated countries 
to improve on their valuation as soon as their intention to make progress is 
recognizable. This applies to the Netherlands, Switzerland, Portugal and 
especially South Africa, that has improved by 16 positions and achieved a good 
rating as well.32 
 
Figure 3: CCPI World Map 201733 
 
Figure 3, a world map of the overall results of the CCPI 2017, allows a 
comparison of the USA with other countries. It has to be mentioned that in the 
ranking, the US were ranked lower than most of the other orange countries of 
which the overall performance was rated as “poor”, such as Brazil, Argentina 
and Poland. Even though the USA were still ranked higher than Canada, 
Russia, Australia, Japan, China and some other countries, all EU member 
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states were ranked higher except for Estonia. Compared to last year’s ranking, 
Portugal and Croatia were the only countries upgrading from moderate to good 
performance. The good performance group, having been headed by Denmark 
during the last four years, is now led by France, Sweden and the UK. Analyzing 
the data given by regions, Europe is leading, followed by South America, Asia, 
North America and Australia. Most parts of Africa are not included in the 
assessment. Striking is the fact that amongst the ten largest carbon dioxide 
emitters in terms of total emissions in 2016, the USA were ranked third highest 
behind India and Germany. This is because out of the seven remaining largest 
carbon emitters in the world all, except for China, were rated as very poor. Vice 
versa, this also implies that out of the 13 countries of which the performance 
was rated as very poor, almost half belong to the ten largest carbon emitters.34 
2.3. USA in Climate Change Negotiations 
2.3.1. Population’s Standpoint 
The USA’s position in climate change negotiations was probably one of the 
most unsteady ones. This might be due to the fact that also the population itself 
is deeply disrupted concerning the climate question. As Figure 4 shows, more 
than three fourths of the population agree that the government should address 
climate change and therefore support the USA’s participation in the Paris 
Agreement. However, only 36% think that climate change is a serious problem 
the world has to face. This lies dramatically below the global survey average of 
52%. With regards to the participants own willingness to contribute to tackling 
climate change, almost half stated they would not even be willing to participate 
with one dollar per month. 
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Figure 4: The US View on Climate Change35 
 
Another survey from November 2015, conducted in 17 countries, suggests that 
in the US, only 9% of the population consider climate change to be the most 
serious problem the world has to face at this point in time. The only country that 
scored even lower was Saudi Arabia with 5%. The absolute leader was Hong 
Kong with exactly one fourth of the population viewing climate change as the 
most serious issue, followed by Sweden, Denmark, Singapore and China. Most 
of the countries in the midrange were settled around 12% to 13%. This group 
consists of Norway, Finland, Australia, Germany, Thailand and the United Arab 
Emirates. Finally, the four countries coming closest to the USA and Saudi 
Arabia were the UK, France, Indonesia and Malaysia with 10% to 11%.36 
Additionally, another study investigated the share of US citizens that agreed to 
the statement that scientists understood that climate change was occurring. It 
was found out that among the moderate or liberal Republicans, only 24% 
agreed to the statement. For the conservative Republicans the share was even 
lower with 18%, being well below the US average of 33%. The moderate or 
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conservative Democrats on the other hand agreed to 31%, which was still 
topped by far by the liberal Democrats, agreeing to 68% to the statement.37 The 
population’s attitude towards climate change is inevitably reflected in the 
governments voted. 
2.3.2. Presidents’ Standpoints 
Even though some presidential records from the Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum indicate that already the Nixon administration had several debates 
about the subject of climate change in 196938, Obama is considered to be the 
first president of the US who has ever actively taken a stand against climate 
change39, after the Kyoto Protocol had never been ratified by the US. Obama’s 
Climate Action Plan was based upon three pillars: cutting the nation’s carbon 
pollution, preparing the country for the impacts of climate change and taking the 
lead in international efforts to tackle global climate change. The first pillar mainly 
focused on the topics of clean energy, transportation, energy waste, other 
greenhouse gas emissions and exemplary behavior at the federal level. The 
second pillar addressed community and infrastructure improvements, the 
protection of natural resources and therewith the economy and finally making 
use of scientific tools and insights in order to manage the impacts of climate 
change. The last pillar is firstly concerned with the collaboration of the US with 
other nations in various ways that can have an influence on climate change and 
secondly with the positioning of the US as a leading force in international 
climate change negotiations.40 
However, since President Trump’s inauguration in January 2017, the US has 
adopted a new course of action. Apart from nullifying climate protecting 
regulations, rules and policies41 such as Obama’s Clean Power Plan42, the new 
administration also stated to be envisioning withdrawing from the Paris 
Agreement and potentially renegotiating the agreement43. This would make the 
US join Nicaragua and Syria as the only non-signatory countries in the world. 
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Nevertheless, Germany’s, France’s and Italy’s leader jointly stated that a 
renegotiation was unthinkable.44 
2.3.3. States’ and Cities’ Standpoints 
In his statement, Trump also said the US would “continue to be the cleanest 
and most environmentally friendly country on Earth”45. Although the term 
continue can be confusing given the results of many climate-related studies, the 
president emphasized the US would manage to be the worldwide leader 
concerning environment issues, even without the Paris Agreement and 
Obama’s regulations. This point of view, however, is not shared by some of the 
USA’s states and cities, which have for this reason founded the U.S. Climate 
Alliance. Figure 5 shows the twelve states being member to the Alliance in 
green, the ten states that committed to still follow the guidelines of the Paris 
Agreement in blue and 274 cities having signed the Mayors National Climate 
Action Agenda in purple.  
 
Figure 5: States and Cities in the US Committing to Climate Protection46 
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Additionally, Puerto Rico is part of the U.S. Climate Alliance, the District of 
Columbia pledged to adhere to the Paris Agreement and more than 900 
businesses, 183 universities and colleges and 125 cities declared their 
participation in the initiative “We Are Still In” by New York’s former mayor 
Bloomberg. The latter also pledged to donate an amount of $15 million to the 
UFCCC to compensate gaps in the funding that might occur due to Trump’s 
climate policy.47 To what extent actions undertaken by parts of the US will play 
a role in international climate negotiations, however, will have to be monitored in 
the future.  
 
3. Introduction to Game Theory 
3.1. General Introduction 
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, game theory is “the branch of 
mathematics concerned with the analysis of strategies for dealing with 
competitive situations where the outcome of a participant’s choice of action 
depends critically on the actions of choice of other participants.”48 
Since having become a formal topic of studies in the 1950s, it has been used in 
various contexts of economics as well as in business, war, evolutionary biology, 
ecology, political science and others. The mathematicians John von Neumann 
and John Nash along with the economist Oscar Morgenstern are considered to 
be the forerunners of the still relatively new and growing science.49 
3.2. Players, Games and Payoffs50 
In game theory, situations in which participants can take a strategic decision are 
called a game. Even though the participants may not literally be playing but for 
example negotiating or fighting, they are called players in game theoretic 
terms. The different payoffs are represented by numbers that indicate how 
desirable any possible outcome of the given situation is. 
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3.3. Strategies 
Every possible action that a player can take is called a strategy. If a strategy is 
always the better option for a player, no matter what the other players do, it is 
called a dominant or dominating strategy. On the other hand, if a strategy is 
constantly dominated by another strategy, game theorists talk about a strictly 
dominated strategy. A strictly dominated strategy is never played by rational 
player. 
A strategy that is always at least as good as the other possible strategies, 
regardless of what the other players do, is called a weakly dominant or weakly 
dominating strategy. Opposed to this is the weakly dominated strategy. 
Strategies can be strictly efficient, which indicates that the whole population is 
better off if all players opt for one identical strategy. 
Instead of playing a pure strategy, players can also choose a mixed strategy, 
which means that they randomly, but with a certain probability, opt for one of 
their strategies.  
3.4. Nash Equilibrium and the Chicken Game 
The Nash Equilibrium indicates the set of strategies that maximizes the payoff 
of each player depending on the other players’ strategies. This means that no 
player can maximize his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. 
One of the most common games with a Nash Equilibrium is the Chicken Game. 
In this game, two drivers want to prove their courage by driving towards each 
other. However, one of them must swerve or they will both die in the car crash. 
This means that there are four possible outcomes: 
- Both of them drive straight. In this case, they will die and their payoff is -
5. This is the worst that can happen to both of them. 
- Driver 1 swerves while driver 2 drives straight. In this situation, driver 2 
wins the game and the benefit of winning is 3 while driver 1 loses the 
game and will be called a “chicken”. He gets a payoff of 0 for he has lost 
the game but at least he has not died. 
- Driver 2 swerves while driver 1 drives straight. In this situation, driver 1 
wins the game and the benefit of winning is 3 while driver 2 loses the 
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game and will be called a “chicken”. He gets a payoff of 0 for he has lost 
the game but at least he has not died. 
- Both of them swerve. In this case, they both get a payoff of 1 because 
they are both alive and none of them has lost the game against the other 
player. 
 
To illustrate this situation, the following matrix can be used: 
  Driver 2 
  Swerve Drive straight 
Driver 1 
Swerve 1, 1 0, 3 
Drive straight 3, 0 -5, -5 
 
Matrix 1: Chicken Game 
 
As we can see, the chicken game is an anti-coordination game, which means 
that in any case, the best strategy for driver 1 is the opposite of driver 2’s 
strategy and vice versa. This means that if driver 2 swerves, it is best for driver 
1 to drive straight in order to win. On the other hand, given that driver 2 drives 
straight, the best strategy for driver 1 is to swerve to avoid a collision. This 
indicates the two Nash equilibria, i.e. the two sets of strategies that maximize 
the drivers’ payoffs given the strategy of the other driver, in the chicken game: 
  Driver 2 
  Swerve Drive straight 
Driver 1 
Swerve 1, 1 0, 3 
Drive straight 3, 0 -5, -5 
 
Matrix 2: NE Chicken Game 
 
It can be argued that for example, driver 1 considers swerving the only 
reasonable strategy, as the cost of dying is significantly higher than the cost of 
losing the game. However, he might think that driver 2 thinks the same and 
therefore driver 1 drives straight because he expects driver 2 to swerve. But 
then he might think that driver 2 thinks that he thinks that it is the most 
reasonable to swerve and therefore expects driver 2 to drive straight and will 
consequently prefer to swerve. This can be continued endlessly and finally, one 
cannot predict which driver will be the one swerving. In many cases, these 
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games are solved through commitment. If one driver acts like being crazy and 
not caring about life before the race, this might convince the other player to 
swerve, whereas behaving unconfident and afraid might lead to the opposite. 
Dynamic or continuous games can be subgame perfect, meaning that every 
subgame, i.e. every round played, can be solved with a Nash equilibrium using 
a certain strategy profile. 
3.5. Criticisms of Game Theory 
“As far as I’m concerned, the opinion of […] people [such as Rabbi Meizel, the 
communist Sala Marcel, my widowed Aunt Hannah, and the intellectual 
Yaacovson] is just as authoritative for making social and economic decisions as 
the opinion of an expert using a model”51, states Ariel Rubinstein, currently one 
of the leading heads and most renowned game theorists in the world. In his 
book Economic Fables he stresses that game theory, as well as any other 
model, tries to abstract complicated situations and thoughts by fitting them into 
formalized models. He compares game theory to a collection of fables that can 
indeed help to gain new insights and look at situations from other perspectives 
but is unable to give concrete advice on how to solve a problem better than an 
amateur. 
Two other criticisms of game theory are that first of all, players are assumed to 
be rational, which has been proven to not always be the case. Secondly, game 
theoretic models have to be fed with high quality data in order to produce high 
quality data. This means that apart from an understanding of game theory, also 
subject specific knowledge is indispensable in order to correctly assess the 
situation, the factors involved and the influence these factors have. 
It can be concluded that game theoretic models can be helpful for gaining 
insights and an understanding of situations and behavior, but should not be 
seen as an infallible source of information and guidance. 
Chapter Conclusion: First of all, it can be concluded that despite 
the continuous diplomatic efforts made to tackle the problem of 
climate change during more than 25 years, the results still 
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appear to be insufficient. Secondly, the US has proven to be a 
factor fundamentally influencing both, climate change and the 
related negotiations. Thirdly, game theory can be used as a tool 
to gain a deeper understanding of a situation and develop new 
insights in a topic. 
Understanding International Climate Change 
Negotiations in the Context of Game Theory 
Chapter Outlook: This chapter presents several approaches to 
understanding climate change negotiations using game 
theoretic tools. At first, it will be investigated how climate 
change negotiations can be modelled as a game. In a second 
step, it will be illustrated through which factors the game could 
be shifted from a prisoner’s dilemma to a potentially more 
favorable coordination game. Some mechanisms to overcome 
one factor, the free rider effect, will be given thereafter. Finally, 
it will be explained under which circumstances a population will 
actually choose the efficient equilibrium in a coordination game, 
which ultimately makes this game more favorable than a 
prisoner’s dilemma and which characteristics make a climate 
agreement successful. 
4. The Climate Game 
4.1. Using Game Theory to Predict Climate Change 
Negotiations: The Predictioneer’s Game 
That game theory can be a useful tool to foresee how political and economic 
events could approximately transpire and even predict the outcomes of 
negotiations has been repeatedly demonstrated by the game theorist Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita. With an accuracy of 90%, his forecasts are being bought 
by international corporations, governments as well as the CIA, which stated that 
Bueno de Mesquita’s models were twice as often correct as its traditional 
analyses. Amongst others, he had successfully predicted the outcomes of 
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2009’s climate change negotiations in Copenhagen in his book The 
Predictioneer’s Game.52 
4.1.1. Modeling Climate Change Negotiations53 
In order to collect the needed data to feed his game theoretic models, he first 
assesses who the main players are and what view they take concerning the 
relevant topic. In case of climate change negotiations, Bueno de Mesquita took 
those governments and interest groups, more precisely NGOs and multinational 
corporations, into account that were most affected, also bearing in mind that 
there was a fraction favoring the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions and one 
opposing for both, multinational corporations (CorpFor and CorpAgainst) and 
the USA (USPro and USAnti). 
In a second step, the game theorist estimates whether the different 
stakeholders have a high potential influence on the negotiations or a rather low 
one, what their position on the topic is, how strong the salience is that the 
respective parties attach to the issue and how much they are committed to 
finding a consensus.  
For example, in his calculations for climate change negotiations (see Table 3), 
the EU scored an 87 in terms of influence whereas Japan had a medium value 
of 15 and NGOs had a low influence in the negotiations of 1. 
The position on the topic was evaluated on a scale from 1 to 100, where 100 
represents the absolute wish for emission controls, a value of 1 indicates a 
position that is absolutely against emission controls and 50 is neutral. While 
NGOs, the EU and CorpFor achieved high values, Japan was slightly against it 
and CorpAgainst, China, India and Brazil were on the lower end of the scale. 
The salience of each stakeholder can also range from 1 to 100, meaning that 
Australia with a score of 50 did not particularly emphasize the question of 
mandatory emission controls, compared to the EU, NGOs, China, India and 
Brazil that did strongly stress it.  
The desire for an agreement, no matter whether in favor of the own position or 
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not, was estimated at values ranging from 60 in the case of Japan and Russia, 
representing an over average desire for agreement, to 10 for CorpAgainst. 
 
Stakeholder Influence Mandatory 
Emission 
Controls 
Salience Desire for 
Agreement 
Australia 6 65 50 50 
Canada 9 60 50 50 
EU 87 95 90 35 
Japan 15 45 60 60 
Russia 6 40 50 60 
USPro 65 70 70 40 
USAnti 35 30 50 30 
CorpFor 3 95 50 50 
CorpAgainst 3 1 75 10 
NGOs 1 99 99 20 
China 15 5 90 30 
India 9 5 90 30 
Brazil 4 3 90 40 
Table 3: Underlying Data for Bueno de Mesquita's Predictions54 
 
The information needed to evaluate the scores was mainly derived from 
interviews with experts and negotiators. Feeding his models with these values 
and adding a 95% confidence interval for all kinds of scenarios, Bueno de 
Mesquita came to the conclusion that Copenhagen would default in producing a 
successor treaty to Kyoto and instead leave the world with a weak deal that 
would not have a long-term impact. 
4.1.2. Criticism 
Bueno de Mesquita’s models are, despite their relatively high hit rate, often 
criticized for not taking into account a country’s or party’s history and culture, as 
these might also be factors influencing the actions and reactions of the 
negotiators. On the other hand, this can also be seen as strength of the model 
for trends and behavior from the past are not projected on the future. 
A second criticism is that, apart from the assignment of values to a few 
variables, the models are entirely computer based instead of relying on a 
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human’s good judgement at last instance. Bueno de Mesquita himself states 
that he had shown his counterparts proofs, publications and predictions that had 
been fulfilled but that anyway he had gotten the reaction that this might be the 
case but that their problems were not computer solvable55. Nevertheless, many 
supporters of his models consider this to be a huge advantage as it can be 
ensured that the results are not influenced by the personal wishes and beliefs of 
the person conducting the forecasts. 
Bueno de Mesquita himself sees the greatest threats of failure for his models in 
irrational behavior, unconsidered maximization strategies and wrong data and 
admits sometimes being surprised by the accuracy of the results despite all 
these things. 56 
4.1.3. Reasons for Weak Outcomes in Climate Change 
Negotiations 
According to The Predictioneer’s Game, it is not surprising that international 
climate change negotiations produce weak results; the author even takes the 
view that they will not help to stop global warming but could possibly even harm, 
as they create the feeling that something is being done, even though this is not 
enough. He argues that climate agreements are not successful in reducing 
carbon emissions because they either do not demand much effort and change 
from the participants or they have no mechanisms to punish the non-fulfillment 
of pledges as they have to be built upon the lowest common denominator in 
order to achieve high participation. Bueno de Mesquita uses the example of the 
Kyoto Protocol, stressing that first of all, out of the 175 nations that have ratified 
the accord, 137, including the emerging economies of Brazil, India and China, 
were only obliged to report on their greenhouse gas emissions without signing a 
pledge, which made compliance no problem for them. Secondly, he mentions 
that there was no mechanism to punish those nations which did not comply with 
their pledges such as Japan and the UK, which facilitated signing the protocol 
without honestly planning to pursue the goals. 57 
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Finally, the game theorist explains his view that in negotiations over a common 
resource, nations, if they are willing to make sacrifices at all, tend to make 
promises that they are unable to keep afterwards, which he compares to 
“cheating” 58 in a game. He concludes that the problems in climate change 
negotiations can be traced back to the tragedy of the commons, which will be 
explained in the next chapter. 
4.2. Tragedy of the commons 
The tragedy of the commons is a theory in economics that describes how the 
individual interest to exploit a resource in order to optimize individual profits can 
lead to the exhaustion of the latter, which means that it is finally unavailable for 
the entire group. 
This concept became widely known since the paper “The tragedy of the 
commons” by Garrett Harding, which dealt with the increasing concern of 
overpopulation, was published in 1968. The example he used was common 
grazing land that could provide a certain amount of animals with an adequate 
amount of food. However, if the number of grazing animals was increased, the 
land became unable to reproduce itself and none of the animals could find any 
more food. 
A real world example of the tragedy of the commons is the cod fish industry on 
the coast of Newfoundland. For centuries, there had been enough cod fish for 
all the fishermen in the area and not more cod fish had been caught than the 
fish population was able to reproduce. Yet, as soon as fisherman became able 
to catch higher amounts of cod fish than before, due to improvements in fishing 
technologies in the 1960s, they started fishing more and more in order to 
maximize their individual profits. The result was that the fish population was 
unable to reproduce itself and the whole industry collapsed in the 1990s.59 
The same principle can be applied to climate change, considering climate and 
therefore the world as we know it as a common resource with limited ability to 
recover, shared among all people and countries and even shared among 
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today’s and future generations. If climate is damaged today for the individual 
interests of single countries, to an extent that cannot be offset by the planet, 
then future generations will have to bear the consequences that a collapsing 
climate system brings and in the end the situation will be worse for all countries 
than if the resource had only been used to the extent that it can support. 
4.3. The Climate Game as a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
What is known as the tragedy of the commons in economics and other fields of 
science, can be explained using the model of the prisoner’s dilemma in game 
theory. 
4.3.1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
Originally, the prisoner’s dilemma describes a situation in which two criminals 
are believed to have committed a crime that would bring them to prison for ten 
years. They are both arrested separately without any possibility to 
communicate. As the policemen do not have enough evidence to sentence the 
two criminals for the entire ten years, they propose a deal to each one of them. 
If they both confess, they will go to prison for ten years. If criminal 1 confesses 
while the other one denies, criminal 1 will be set free while criminal 2 will be 
sentenced for 15 years and vice versa. If both of them stay silent, the policemen 
can only arrest them for five years due to lacking evidence. This leads us to the 
following matrix in years: 
 
  Criminal 2 
  Confess Deny 
Criminal 1 
Confess 10, 10 0, 15 
Deny 15, 0 5, 5 
 
Matrix 3: Prisoner's Dilemma 
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Converting the years into payoffs, the matrix could look like this: 
  Criminal 2 
  Confess Deny 
Criminal 1 
Confess -2, -2 0, -3 
Deny -3, 0 -1, -1 
 
Matrix 4: NE Prisoner's Dilemma 
 
If criminal 2 confesses, the best response for criminal 1 is to confess as well. If 
criminal 2 denies, it is still the best strategy for criminal 1 to confess and vice 
versa. Obviously, confessing is a dominant strategy for both of them, because 
there is no incentive to deviate in order to maximize the payoffs. Therefore, the 
Nash equilibrium is (confess, confess). However, the Nash equilibrium is not the 
optimal outcome: For both of them, the payoff could have been higher in the 
case (deny, deny). The prisoner’s dilemma shows that pursuing individual 
interests does not necessarily lead to the optimal outcome for all players. 
4.3.2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma in Climate Change 
Negotiations 
Climate change negotiations can also be modelled as a prisoner’s dilemma. 
Highly simplified, it can be assumed that a single country can either choose to 
continue exploiting the climate or to act against climate change. However, this 
has a certain cost. This could result in the following four scenarios: 
- If the single country along with all the other countries, i.e. the rest of the 
world, decides to act against climate change, they all bear the cost while 
benefitting from a reduced risk of climate change. 
- If the single country chooses to act against climate change but the others 
choose to exploit, the single country bears the cost alone while the other 
countries can create benefits and a competitive advantage from the 
exploitation. Additionally, the single country’s sole efforts to reduce the 
risk from climate change most probably are not sufficient to make a 
difference. 
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- In the case that all countries decide to exploit the climate, they can all 
create some benefits right now but have a high risk of climate change 
with severe consequences in the future. 
- Finally, if the rest of the world chooses to act against climate change and 
bears the associated costs and the single country continues exploiting, it 
can still benefit from a reduced risk of climate change but has no cost for 
the required investments while creating a competitive advantage.  
 
As a matrix, the game looks as follows: 
  Rest of the World 
  Act Exploit 
Single 
Country 
Act cost but reduced risk, 
cost but reduced risk 
cost and high risk, 
benefit and high risk 
Exploit benefit and reduced risk, 
cost but reduced risk 
benefit and high risk, 
benefit and high risk 
 
Matrix 5: The Climate Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Depending on whether the risk of climate change is considered to outweigh the 
cost of acting against it or not, payoffs can be distributed differently. This can 
vary from country to country. For example, while one country might suffer 
strongly from climate change, e.g. small island states, another country might in 
the beginning even benefit from global warming due to better access to oil as a 
result of melting polar ice caps or other developments. Assuming a stage of 
climate change in which countries attribute a cost of -3 to the potential risk of 
global warming and a cost of -1 to the immediate costs for acting against it, 
whereas the benefit from exploiting might be represented by a payoff of +1, the 
matrix for the single country looks as follows: 
  Rest of the World 
  Act Exploit 
Single 
Country 
Act -1 -4 
Exploit 1 -2 
 
Matrix 6: The Climate Game, Payoffs Prisoner’s Dilemma60 
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Given that the rest of the world decides to exploit, the best strategy for the 
single country is to also exploit in order to maximize its payoff. However, given 
that the rest of the world acts against climate change, it still is the best choice 
for the single country to exploit because it can free ride, i.e. it can still benefit 
from a reduced risk of climate change while benefitting from the exploitation. 
This means that exploiting is the dominant strategy for the single country and 
the best outcome for it would be if the rest of the world acted but the country 
itself continued to exploit. If this applies to every country, the prisoner’s dilemma 
is inevitable, because there is no incentive for a single country to unilaterally 
switch its strategy. Every country will choose to exploit at a payoff of -2, even 
though the world could have done better and every country could have 
increased its payoff with the option (act, act) and with a payoff of -1. Assuming 
a continuous risk reduction from acting against climate change, the following 
graph illustrates a single country’s payoff function given the number of other 
countries acting against global warming: 
 
Figure 6: Payoff Function Prisoner's Dilemma61 
 
It is obvious that independent of the number of other countries acting, the payoff 
of a single country is strictly higher when exploiting. 
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The game theorist Barrett states that what is important to know, is that 
international agreements are highly unlikely to succeed when they are based on 
voluntary cooperation, which is required in order to solve the prisoner’s 
dilemma, but quite likely to succeed when being based on coordination 
instead62. How coordination games such as the stag hunt game work and how 
climate negotiations can be modelled using this type of game will be discussed 
in the following chapter. 
4.4. The Climate Game as a Coordination Game 
The main difference between a stag hunt game, i.e. a coordination game, and a 
prisoner’s dilemma is that in the latter, the players are always better off not 
cooperating, i.e. exploiting, even if they know that the other party will cooperate, 
In the stag hunt game, this is not the case: both parties are better off 
coordinating their strategies. 
4.4.1. The Stag Hunt Game 
Originally, the stag hunt game models a situation in which two huntsmen go out 
hunting individually, knowing that the other one is out in the forest as well. They 
can choose to either hunt a hare, which is not worth very much but can be 
caught by a single person, or to hunt a stag, which is worth much more but is 
impossible to be caught by one person alone. This means that the chances for 
catching a hare always stay the same, independent of what the other huntsman 
does. However, the chances for hunting a stag drastically increase if both 
huntsmen opt for hunting the stag. As shown in the following matrix, there are 
two pure strategy Nash equilibria: 
  Huntsman 2 
  Stag Hare 
Huntsman 1 
Stag 5, 5 0, 1 
Hare 1, 0 1, 1 
 
Matrix 7: Stag Hunt 
 
If huntsman 2 decides to hunt a hare, huntsman 1 is better off also hunting a 
hare. Yet, if huntsman 2 chooses to hunt a stag, there is no incentive for hunting 
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a hare instead of a stag. Despite the two equilibria, only the Nash equilibrium 
(stag, stag) is strictly efficient, meaning that both huntsmen would be better off 
opting bilaterally for this option.  
4.4.2. The Stag Hunt Game in Climate Change Negotiations 
Climate negotiations can be modelled accordingly, assuming that the frequently 
cited 2°C limit of global warming was slightly beyond an absolute threshold 
which, if crossed, led to a total climate catastrophe including enormously rising 
sea levels, millions of people from coast areas becoming climate refugees, 
severe droughts, bush fires and floods. This changes the payoff structure 
completely. While the benefit from exploiting remains at 1 and the cost of acting 
against global warming might even triple to -3, the former risk of climate change 
will then change to being a fact with a cost of -6. To simplify the model, it will be 
supposed that every country has either the option to limit its greenhouse gas 
emissions at least to the amount that equals 2°C relative to the country’s stake 
or to continue exploiting. This implies that if only one country defects, the tipping 
point will be crossed at a cost of -6. This results in the following matrix: 
  Rest of the World 
  Act Exploit 
Single 
Country 
Act -3, -3 -9, -5 
Exploit -5, -9 -5, -5 
 
Matrix 8: The Climate Game, Stag Hunt63 
 
Assuming that the cost from climate change stays continually the same until the 
threshold of 2°C is reached, i.e. every country is participating, the following 
graphs show a single country’s payoff function given the number of other 
countries acting against global warming: 
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Figure 7: Payoff Function, Stag Hunt 164 
 
As can be seen, in the interval [0;194], the single country’s payoff from 
exploiting is constantly higher than from acting, equal to the prisoner’s 
dilemma’s situation. However, the second graph allows a closer insight in what 
is happening when instead of 194 all other countries, i.e. 195, choose to act 
against global warming: 
 
Figure 8: Payoff Function Stag Hunt 265 
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At the point at which all other countries have decided to meet the country 
specific goal of limiting their emissions to the equivalent of 2°C, the single 
country’s payoff from acting exceeds the one from exploiting by two. This is of 
course an enormous incentive for the country to act if it thinks that the other 
countries will act, too. Additionally, this indicates that there are two Nash 
equilibria: either all countries choose to act or all countries choose to exploit. 
Even though only the equilibrium (act, act) is strictly efficient, the model cannot 
tell which of the two equilibria will be chosen. Apart from that, in real life, 
countries have of course more choices. While one country might not contribute 
at all, another country might reduce emissions by more than the amount that is 
required from it. On the other hand, it might be that a small country significantly 
decreases emissions while a big country continues to exploit and thus sets off 
the small country’s achievements. 
This type of coordination game might sound simple. So, why has coordination 
not worked for climate change negotiations so far? One of the reasons might be 
uncertainty regarding the thresholds and impacts of climate change. This will be 
investigated in the next chapter.  
 
5. Factors that Change the Game 
5.1. The Role of Uncertainty in Climate Change 
Negotiations 
5.1.1. Tipping points 
It is widely discussed in science, whether there is a big tipping point in climate 
change, i.e. whether at some point in time global climate will irreversibly pass 
over to another climatic state. The reason for the high uncertainty is that first of 
all, the data available is insufficient to make clear predictions and secondly, it is 
only possible to model the processes underlying climate change to a certain 
degree. 
In order to find out more about the probability of crossing a climatic tipping point 
given different levels of global temperature rise, Kriegler et al. (2009) have 
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investigated the beliefs of 43 scientists who are experts in this field with regards 
to five highly temperature-sensitive systems: the Atlantic meridional overturning 
circulation, the Greenland ice sheet, the West Antarctic ice sheet, the Amazon 
rainforest and the El Niño / Southern Oscillation. These systems are seen as 
good indicators for climatic tipping points because one of their main drivers is 
global mean temperature and they are known for reacting disproportionately 
strongly to minor changes. 
Even though it may be criticized that expert beliefs can only create scientific 
knowledge if backed up by facts or theory, it is argued that expert elicitations 
are increasingly recognized in climate science and have proven to be a useful 
instrument for collecting and illustrating scientific information. In order to assure 
a conservative valuation of the data gathered, Kriegler et al.’s study uses an 
imprecise probability assessment approach, which means that instead of 
attributing a probability that closest matches the expert’s statement, those 
probabilities that do not align with the expert’s belief are excluded. Additionally, 
the study focusses on the lower end of the experts’ probability estimations. 
The researchers found out that experts do not consider the crossing of tipping 
points to be far off, despite the generally high degree of uncertainty concerning 
the provocation of severe climatic changes. In addition, the study’s results 
suggest noticeably higher probabilities for triggering climatic tipping points than 
other climate damage valuations do. The lower probabilities for crossing at least 
one tipping point of the five indicators explained above are estimated to be 0.16 
for a global temperature rise of 2-4°C and 0.56 in case of a temperature rise 
above 4°C, base year being 2000. Nevertheless, the paper emphasizes the 
considerable uncertainty in detecting critical climate change thresholds.66 
5.1.2. Uncertainty in Climate Change Negotiations 
Although it is obviously clear that climate change is happening, neither the 
exact magnitude of the impacts, nor a tipping point is clearly assessable at this 
point in time. For that reason, there is a high degree of uncertainty that also has 
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an impact on the countries’ decision making processes in climate change 
negotiations. 
A Theoretical Investigation on Uncertainty in Climate Change Negotiations 
In the paper Climate Treaties and Approaching Catastrophes, Barrett develops 
a theory that seeks to answer the question whether the fright of triggering a 
catastrophic tipping point might help countries succeed in enforcing climate 
treaties and increase their effectivity. 
The theory suggests that certainty about the impacts of climate change should 
have little impact, whereas certainty about the exact threshold should be of 
critical importance and could turn the game from a prisoner’s dilemma into a 
stag hunt. One important factor is considered to be the cost of global warming. 
If this is not high enough compared to the cost of acting against it, the game 
remains a cooperation game, i.e. a prisoner’s dilemma. However, if the cost of 
climate change is high compared to the cost of acting, a self-enforcing 
agreement that uses the treaty as a device for coordination is possible and can 
extremely increase the treaty’s effectiveness.  
Furthermore, the theory claims that the incentive to free ride is highly reduced 
when the threshold is certain, as marginally exceeding the threshold causes a 
huge increase in damages, i.e. the change is discontinuous. In contrast, if the 
threshold is uncertain, slightly crossing the limit having been set only slightly 
increases the expected damage. Therefore, also the incentive to free ride is 
only slightly reduced. Consequently, Barrett concludes that a substantial 
reduction of the threshold uncertainty could help immensely in improving 
climate change negotiations. As science cannot identify an exact threshold at 
this point in time, another method that could set such a limit, which is not meant 
to be a serious proposition by the author but rather a food for thought for the 
reader, is a doomsday machine that starts a worldwide catastrophe when a 
certain level of greenhouse gases is in the atmosphere. 67 
Experimental Investigation on the Theory I 
This theory was tested in two papers using experimental economics, meaning 
that countries were represented by people or more precisely by German 
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undergraduate students who played a comparable game with real money. In the 
first game, the 200 participants were divided into groups of 10 students. Each of 
them received 10 black poker chips worth 10ct each and ten red chips at a 
value of 1€ each. In every round the participants could decide whether to hand 
in any number of their chips or whether to hold on to them. One chip handed in 
is worth 5ct for every participant. In order to make the game a coordination 
game, the threshold given was that if not at least 150 chips were handed back 
in total, everyone would lose 15€. This implies that if every participant handed in 
exactly 15 chips, the 15€ would be saved for everyone in the group. 
It turned out that on average, more than half of the participants handed back 
exactly 15 chips, the mean being 15.1 chips. Knowing this, the game can be 
compared to a stag hunt game: as long as a player does not think that all the 
nine others will contribute their stake of 15 chips, there is no incentive to hand in 
any chips but to take the payoff of 2.75€. Yet, if the player believes that the 
others will make their contribution, the incentive of 12.50€ to do so as well is 
significantly higher. Two key insights of this stage of the game were that first of 
all, the incentive to free ride appears to be considerably less attractive than the 
incentive to coordinate. In addition, 15 turned out to be a focal point that 
enabled coordination to succeed, as it assigned a stake to every participant. 
In order to test the theory that impact uncertainty has no impact on the results 
whereas threshold uncertainty is the determining factor, the following rounds of 
the game have different treatments of uncertainties. Instead of an exact 
threshold of 150 chips, an interval from 100 to 200 with an expected value of 
150 is given and instead of an absolute impact value of 15€, an interval from 
10€ to 20€ with an expected value of 15€ is given. 
The results in Figure 9 show the probability of catastrophe by treatment. In the 
treatment with absolute certainty, catastrophe could be avoided 8 times out of 
10, whereas the two catastrophe cases are explained to be outliers. In the 
situation of uncertain impact (I-Uncertainty), it was even avoided 10 out of 10 
times. In the case of threshold uncertainty (T-Uncertainty), the probability of 
catastrophe could be reduced to less than 100% by only 1 of 10 groups and in 
the event of impact and threshold uncertainty (IT-Uncertainty) by only 3 of 10 
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groups. The computer programme found out that in the four cases where the 
probability of catastrophe had been reduced to less than 100%, the threshold 
was crossed every time. 
 
Figure 9: Probability of Catastrophe by Treatment68 
 
Looking at the four bars it is obvious that impact uncertainty did not negatively 
influence the results of the game, while threshold uncertainty always led to a 
catastrophic failure, meaning that the theoretical assumptions have proved to 
be right in the experiment. 
Figure 10 emphasizes another interesting observation of the experiment. In the 
treatments with certainty and impact uncertainty, pledges and contributions 
were close together, with contributions that usually exceeded the pledges, 
except for two outliers in which the players cheated by making a pledge of 15 
but contributing nothing. In contrast, in both situations with threshold 
uncertainty, the values were largely distributed and the contributions were in 
most of the cases falling clearly short of the pledges that had been made 
before.69 
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Figure 10: Pledges and Actual Contributions by Treatment70 
 
Experimental Investigation on the Theory II 
In a second experiment it is tested whether there is a dividing line for threshold 
uncertainty along which behavior differs significantly. As can be seen in Figure 
11, the experiment suggests a dividing line located on the lower end of the 
uncertainty range. It can be identified that on the left hand side of the dividing 
line, proposals, pledges and contributions are close together. In contrast, right 
behind the dividing line, proposals and pledges stay approximately constant but 
contributions fall short of the pledges by far.  
It can be concluded that in case of threshold uncertainty, trends indicate a 
change in behavior at an early point of the uncertainty interval and a significant 
decline of contributions made.71 
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Figure 11: Behavior Change along the Dividing Line72 
 
The experiments described support the theory that threshold uncertainty is 
crucial for the success of climate change negotiations as certainty about the 
threshold could convert a prisoner’s dilemma into a coordination game. 
However, science is currently not able to make definite predictions about a 
tipping point and as a doomsday machine is not a suitable solution, other 
mechanisms are necessary in order to change the climate game. 
5.2. Reciprocity Strategies 
5.2.1. Tit for Tat 
Another way to confront the prisoner’s dilemma is adopting an intrinsic strategy 
of reciprocity, such as tit for tat. This can be useful to achieve cooperation if the 
game is played an indefinite number of times. The strategy developed by 
Axelrod in 1984 requires the player to always copy the strategy the other player 
has played the round before. For example, in the first round, player 1 
cooperates in order to escape the prisoner’s dilemma. If player 2 then decides 
to cooperate as well, player 1 will reward player 2 for the cooperation by also 
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cooperating again, which results in a better payoff for both. However, if player 2 
defaults, player 1 will reciprocate this move in the next round and default as well 
in order to punish the uncooperative behavior. 
One famous example of a tit for tat strategy is the First World War, during which 
both sides’ soldiers in the trenches practiced unspoken armistice. This 
developed from the consideration that by killing a soldier from the other camp, 
the wish for revenge would soon lead to the death of an own soldier. This 
phenomenon got also known as the live and let live strategy. 
5.2.2. Tit for Tat in Climate Change Negotiations 
This strategy can also be applied to climate change negotiations, as it is 
believed that intrinsic strategies can help sustain cooperation in international 
settings. This implies that cooperation occurs if the other parties have 
cooperated in the past. Yet, if one side defaults at some point in time, this would 
result in continuously uncooperative outcomes. For example, if the EU started 
off by playing a cooperative strategy but other major economies would not step 
in as well, the EU might decide to also switch its strategy to a non-cooperative 
one, leading to other parties defaulting in turn.73 This could be relaxed through a 
tit for two tats approach, in which strategies are only switched if the other party 
fails to cooperate twice. This means that it pardons misbehavior to a certain 
degree. Another main concern of tit for tat is that it is not subgame perfect and 
therefore not a rational strategy for individual players.74 
Tingley and Tomz investigated how receptive the citizens, being the ones voting 
for the governments that ultimately decide on a nation’s strategy in climate 
change negotiations, are to reciprocity strategies. Their findings suggest that 
this type of strategy is unlikely to work in the context of climate change, except if 
linked to other incentives or implemented in international law. More precisely, in 
case of the USA it was found that even though a pollution cycle was rather 
unlikely, as US citizens did not want their nation’s emissions to increase 
collectively with other countries’ emissions. Nevertheless, it could be concluded 
that they were not prepared to play a tit for tat strategy, fearing other countries 
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could free ride, which consequently gives other countries less incentive to 
cooperate.75 For that reason, a mechanism against free riding could be a 
valuable tool to also render reciprocity strategies more attractive in climate 
change negotiations.  
 
6. Mechanisms to Overcome the Free Rider Effect 
6.1. Changing Payoffs 
Another option to change a game is to manipulate the payoffs. This can be 
done by setting incentives that make strategies more or less attractive than 
before. Matrix 9 and Matrix 10 show one option how the initial prisoner’s 
dilemma payoff matrix could be transformed into a coordination game. 
 
  Rest of the World 
  Act Exploit 
Single 
Country 
Act -1 -4 
Exploit 1 -2 
 
Matrix 9: Initial Prisoner's Dilemma Payoff Matrix 
The initial matrix assumed a cost of -3 for the potential risk of global warming, a 
cost of -1 for the immediate costs for acting and a payoff of +1 for the benefit 
from exploiting. Adding a cost for compensation equal to the risk of global 
warming, i.e. -3, if the country is not willing to act while the rest of the world 
does act, the payoffs change, as can be seen in the modified matrix: 
  Rest of the World 
  Act Exploit 
Single 
Country 
Act -1 -4 
Exploit -2 -2 
 
Matrix 10: Initial Payoff Matrix Modified76 
 
This transformation overrides the free rider effect, meaning that there is no 
more incentive for the single country to exploit, given that the rest of the world 
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acts, in order to benefit from the other countries’ efforts. Therefore, this 
transformation abrogates exploiting as the dominant strategy for the single 
country and makes the best response the strategy the other players have 
chosen as well, i.e. coordinating with the rest of the world. How this result can 
be achieved and what a suitable compensation could look like has been 
examined in several papers. The main ideas will be presented in the following. 
6.2. Climate Clubs 
6.2.1. Clubs as Economic Mechanisms 
In his Paper Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate 
Policy, Nordhaus investigated the possibility of what he calls climate clubs, 
groups that work towards a shared goal such as the conservation of a common 
resource by sharing the associated cost in order to profit from the created 
benefits, as a mechanism to prevent countries from free riding. He stresses that 
for two reasons, climate change negotiations are more complex than most other 
issues. First of all, they are especially concerned with the free rider effect 
because there is not only an incentive to free ride on the efforts made by other 
countries but also on the welfare of future generations, which is called a 
temporal free riding effect. Secondly, the Westphalian dilemma, which 
significates the fundamentals of international modern law, i.e. sovereignty of all 
states, their right to self-determination, legal equality and the right to handle 
their internal activities independent from other states’ intervention, makes 
overcoming the free rider effect extremely difficult. 
Clubs are generally required to fulfill four criteria. First, the club’s subject has to 
be a shareable resource of the sort of a public good. Secondly, the cooperative 
outcome has to be favorable to the participants. Thirdly, parties that do not take 
part can be left out or penalized and lastly, there is no incentive for the 
members to leave the club. The similarity of all kinds of clubs is that the 
members have to contribute their portion to the successful course of the club. 
6.2.2. Clubs and Climate Change Negotiations 
In the special case of climate change, a climate club is characterized as a pact 
between countries with the goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a 
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coordinated way. As an enforcement mechanism, Nordhaus proposes an 
international target carbon price that should serve as a focal point for all 
participating countries. For example, members of the climate club could impose 
taxes on carbon, a cap and trade mechanism or a mixture of both in order to 
achieve a domestic carbon price that is in line with the minimum value set by 
the climate club. In order to make joining the club attractive, non-members are 
penalized through import tariffs. In contrast to most other propositions, 
Nordhaus does not only consider tariffs on goods that are carbon intensive in 
production and use but general import tariffs imposed on non-participants of the 
club. 
Table 4 shows a numerical example of the mode of functioning of a climate 
club. It assumes that the USA are in their decision making process whether to 
participate in a climate club or not, given an international target carbon price of 
$25 per ton and the participation of all other countries with high income. 
 
  US is participant US is not a participant 
Penalty tariff rate 0 percent 4 percent 0 percent 4 percent 
Abatement -11.9 -11.9 -0.3 -0.3 
Damages 10.7 10.7 7.3 7.3 
Trade 0.0 36.7 0.0 -15.6 
Net benefits -1.2 35.5 7.0 -8.6 
Net effect of participation   -8.2 44.1 
 
Table 4: Net Effect of Participation for USA77, 78 
 
As can be seen, the values for abatement costs are almost 40 times as high if 
the US participates in the climate club as if it refuses to do so. If the country 
participates in the climate club, climate damages, which behave proportionately 
to global emissions, can be reduced more significantly. Therefore, the benefit is 
$3.4 billion per year higher than if the USA does not participate. Finally, trade, 
as the only factor being influenced by penalty tariffs, is of course significantly 
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higher if the nation can benefit from free trade with all the club member states 
than if it is penalized for not taking part. This leads to net benefits ranging from -
$8.6 billion in the case of non-participation and 4% tariff rates to $35.5 billion in 
the case of participation and penalty tariff. The net effect of participation for the 
US is therefore $-8.2 billion if no tariffs are imposed on non-participating 
countries and $44.1 billion if a tariff rate of 4% is applied. The impact of the 
penalty tariff is therefore $52.3 billion per year. This underlines that the concept 
of a climate club does only work if there is a strong incentive in the form of a 
penalty tariff for countries to participate. 
6.2.3. Predictions 
Predictions about participation levels, given different international target carbon 
prices and tariff rates, are summarized in Figure 12. The number of participating 
regions can be read from the y-axis, while the x-axis shows four different carbon 
prices, each with eleven bars that represent tariff rates from 0% to 10%. 
 
Figure 12: Number of Participating Regions by International Target 
Carbon Price and Tariff Rate79 
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The theoretic calculations suggest that for an international target carbon price 
with up to $50 per ton, imposing relatively low tariffs on outside states could 
already lead to a high level of participation. This implies that a situation is 
generated in which self-interest drives countries to join the climate club and 
accept important emissions reductions for having access to the trade benefits 
from being part of the club. Additionally, the study concludes that stable 
coalitions in a climate club are only possible with trade sanctions against non-
members, except for the ones with insignificant abatement.80 
Notwithstanding the reasonable evidence given in the paper, Nordhaus’ theory 
has also been questioned in some points. While the paper assumes that 
international trade could be connected to emission reduction commitments, 
other researchers point out that in case of penalty tariffs, a policy of retaliation 
could be expected from the penalized countries, which has not been considered 
in the theory. This could change the former simple game with the only 
reasonable strategy for countries and therefore the only Nash equilibrium being 
to participate in the climate club to either a prisoner’s dilemma or a coordination 
game. Another point that has been criticized is that the theory predicts a 
successful climate club for international target carbon prices with up to $50 per 
ton. However, this amount is considered to be too small in order to fight severe 
climate change. Additionally, it would be favorable to have a vast majority of 
countries acting against climate change instead of single fractions. Finally, it is 
criticized that Nordhaus builds his theory upon the assumption that countries 
value trade cooperation more than they value climate cooperation, which might, 
despite the imparities in success of treaty making processes, not necessarily be 
the case.81 
6.3. Linear Compensation 
6.3.1. The Concept 
Another approach to prevent countries from free riding in climate affairs is 
presented by Heitzig, Lessmann and Zou. Instead of tying greenhouse gas 
emission reductions to trade, which does not only hurt the nation being 
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punished but indirectly also the punishing country, it is proposed to introduce a 
linear compensation mechanism. This tool measures a country’s performance 
relative to the other participants’ achievements instead of evaluating the 
performance on an absolute basis. This means that if one country does not 
meet its reduction goals and all other nations have not met them either, i.e. the 
average underperformance is significantly above zero, the single country will be 
punished less than if all the other countries had met their emissions reduction 
goals. Therefore, the punishment for not achieving the individual goals is 
proportional to the nation’s deviation from the average performance of all 
countries. In this case, the punishment is not given by a trade restriction but by 
an increase of the following year’s emissions reduction target.82 
There are several reasons for which a method of linear compensation could 
help with the problems encountered in climate change negotiations. First of all, 
it can deal with the uncertainty about the difficulty of decreasing greenhouse 
gas emissions. If it turns out to be easy to do so on the one hand, for example 
due to technological advances or other factors, and most countries have no 
issues meeting or exceeding their targets, those countries that underperform or 
do not put in enough money or efforts will be penalized relatively hard. On the 
other hand, if it appears to be unexpectedly difficult to decrease emissions by 
the targets that had been set and the majority of nations fall short of their initial 
targets, the countries below average are penalized relatively less. 
Secondly, the countries’ performance is evaluated on the basis of a descriptive 
norm as it compares nations and their success in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions with each other. From a social psychology point of view, this ongoing 
comparison with peers is a factor that can strongly influence an individual’s 
behavior. However, whether the same is true for entire nations is unsure. 
Another advantage of the linear compensation mechanism is that it is subgame 
perfect and that the dominant strategy is always cooperating, as the net benefits 
of defecting are continually smaller than those of cooperating. 
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6.3.2. Criticism 
Nevertheless, there are some points in Heitzig et al.’s work that can be 
criticized. One criticism is that perfect information is assumed. This might 
actually not be the case, as governments usually do not like to put their cards 
on the table and sometimes even make pledges or promises that they know 
they will not be able to keep. The biggest threat of the linear compensation 
mechanism though is a downward spiral of the abatement levels. This is 
because the evaluation of a member relative to the other nations’ performance 
does not only imply that a country that has underperformed in one period is 
penalized accordingly, but also that a country that has performed above 
average in one period will be required less abatement in the next phase. This 
suggests that abatement levels might turn out to be too low or after some time 
even out at a certain level.  
Finally, the model is limited to nations, even though there can be found 
influential parties other than the states themselves such as subordinate 
institutions, big corporations or NGOs. Therefore, the theory’s assumption that 
all players are acting purely rational, which is a frequent criticism of game 
theory in general, might not be applicable to all of these stakeholders.83 
Even though the model has some weaknesses and besides does not offer a 
proposal on how to negotiate the individual emissions reduction targets, it fulfills 
its purpose of eliminating the free rider effect and could therefore be a valuable 
tool, in connection with other mechanisms, to give climate change negotiations 
a new direction and shift the prisoner’s dilemma to a coordination game. 
 
7. Choosing the Right Nash Equilibrium in a 
Coordination Game 
7.1. Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies 
Even though there are mechanisms that might have the potential to change the 
climate game from a prisoner’s dilemma to a coordination game, the battle is 
still not won. A coordination game has two Nash equilibria, i.e. two situations in 
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which there is no incentive to deviate, so how will the countries choose between 
multilaterally acting or multilaterally not acting? 
Recalling the initial stag hunt matrix, it can be seen that there are two pure 
strategy Nash equilibria in the stag hunt game, yet only one of them being 
strictly efficient. 
  Huntsman 2 
  Stag Hare 
Huntsman 1 
Stag 5, 5 0, 1 
Hare 1, 0 1, 1 
 
Matrix 11: Initial Stag Hunt 
 
Nevertheless, in order to decide which strategy to choose, the two players can 
also estimate a probability of the other player opting for “stag” and calculate the 
expected payoff in mixed strategies. 
For the example of the stag hunt game, this means that if huntsman 1 thinks 
that with a probability p of 50% huntsman 2 will choose to hunt the stag, the 
expected payoffs V from hunting a stag, respectively a hare are: 
V(stag, 0.5) = 0.5 x 5 + 0.5 x 0 = 2.5  
V(hare, 0.5) = 0.5 x 1 + 0.5 x 1 = 1.0 . 
In this case, huntsman 1 should hunt the stag because the expected payoff of 
2.5 outweighs the expected payoff of 1 from hunting a hare. 
On the other hand, if huntsman 1 thinks that with a probability p of only 10% 
huntsman 2 will choose to hunt the stag, the expected payoffs V from also 
hunting a stag, respectively a hare are: 
V(stag, 0.1) = 0.1 x 5 + 0.1 x 0 = 0.5 . 
V(hare, 0.9) = 0.9 x 1 + 0.9 x 1 = 1.8 . 
In this situation, huntsman 1 will prefer hunting the hare, because the expected 
payoff of 1.8 outweighs the expected payoff of 0.5 from hunting a stag. 
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This shows that, if there was a stag hunt game with two Nash equilibria, in order 
to move the behavior of a population from one Nash equilibrium to another one 
that is strictly efficient, the players need to have enough confidence that the 
other players, too, will switch from the non-cooperative to the cooperative 
strategy and stay there consistently. 
7.2. Implications for Climate Change Negotiations 
In terms of climate change negotiations, it can be concluded that even if there 
were mechanisms implemented to successfully make the climate game a 
coordination game, there is still no guarantee that the countries will opt for the 
strictly efficient Nash equilibrium, which would be to multilaterally act against 
climate change even though this would in fact be the best option for all parties. 
Sustaining the cooperative outcome requires a sufficiently large amount of 
participants opting for this option in order to ensure the beneficial advantage of 
the equilibrium. However, making countries leave the inefficient equilibrium 
involves confidence that the other countries, too, will change their strategy, 
because unilaterally switching strategy is not beneficial. This is a crucial point 
as countries in general may not be very trustful towards each other. 
Additionally, for countries, switching their strategies implies fundamental risks 
as they cannot know in advance whether other countries will actually comply 
with their pledges while the cost of switching strategy occurs immediately. For 
example, if country 1 and 2 both agree to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions by a certain percentage until 2030, country 1 will have immediate 
costs for the implementation of emissions reduction strategies while it will take 
until 2030 to know whether country 2 does also comply with the agreement. 
This might result in a tendency towards lower abatement levels as countries 
might not want to invest heavily while being unsure about the actual efforts of 
other countries. To close the circle, if countries think that other countries might 
think the same, establishing enough trust between the parties in order to sustain 
the efficient equilibrium seems rather implausible.  
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8. Characteristics of Successful Climate Agreements 
It has been found that developing successful climate agreements is highly 
difficult for two reasons. Firstly, setting incentives to transform a prisoner’s 
dilemma into a coordination game is challenging if high participation levels as 
well as high abatement levels should be achieved. Secondly, in a coordination 
game it is still problematic to move the population towards the cooperative 
outcome, i.e. the strictly efficient Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, there have 
been successful environmental agreements. This raises the question: What 
distinguishes a successful agreement from the other ones? 
8.1. Failure of the Kyoto Protocol 
The first step to answer this question is to understand why the Kyoto Protocol is 
often considered to be unsuccessful in its attempts to reduce global greenhouse 
gas emissions. Aichele and Felbermayr have analyzed 40 sample countries’ 
carbon dioxide emissions and their carbon footprint. The latter comprises all 
emissions caused by the residents’ consumption of goods, independent of 
whether these goods are imported goods or produced by the country itself. In 
contrast, the carbon emissions relevant to the Kyoto Protocol are the domestic 
emissions, containing all the carbon emissions that have occurred during the 
production of goods, whether consumed domestically or exported, within the 
country’s territory. Obviously, a country’s carbon footprint does not necessarily 
correlate with its carbon emissions. The resulting difference is called the carbon 
content of net trade. 
The following Table 5 shows the 40 sample countries’ carbon trade and 
emission levels per capita at their initial levels in 1995 and the associated 
change rates. As can be seen, twelve countries are included that have not 
signed the Kyoto Protocol. Out of the other 28 countries, 23 have ratified the 
Protocol in 2002. In 1995, the per capita carbon dioxide emissions varied from 
0.88 tons in India and 1.04 tons in Indonesia to 16.24 tons in Australia and even 
19.65 tons in the USA. Also the average yearly growth rates vary significantly 
from 5.34% for China and 4.05% for Indonesia to negative growth rates of -
2.91% for Sweden and -3.35% for Denmark. 
Looking at the carbon dioxide footprints, the tendency is clear: countries with 
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high carbon emissions had a high carbon footprint, too, the correlation 
coefficient being 0.93. In 1995, India and Indonesia had the lowest per capita 
carbon footprints with 0.73 tons and 1.09 tons. The highest ones were 19.97, 
16.42 and 15.10 tons in the USA, Canada and Denmark, respectively. 
Therefore, it is even more striking that the correlation coefficient of the average 
yearly growth rates of carbon emissions and footprint is only 0.42. The average 
yearly growth rate of the per capita carbon footprints vary from 4.37% and 
4.65% for Estonia and Spain to -1.74% for Belgium-Luxembourg and -2.40% for 
Denmark on the lower end.  
Finally, the net carbon dioxide emission imports as a percentage of the 
domestic emissions are indicated for the years 1995 and 2007, whereof 14 had 
negative net imports, i.e. net exports, in 1995 and 17 out of 40 in 2007. The net 
carbon imports can have a considerable impact on a country’s carbon footprint. 
For example, in 1995, Switzerland imported goods that embodied almost the 
amount of the entire domestic emissions. In 2007, it was even more than 140% 
of its domestic carbon emissions. Also other countries like France, Sweden, 
Norway and the Netherlands had imports between 30% and 50% of the 
domestic emissions in 2007. While the biggest exporters with 20% to 30% were 
Romania, South Africa, Estonia and Finland in 1995, twelve years later China 
took the lead with exports of 27.3% of the domestic carbon emissions, followed 
by South Africa with slightly above 20%.  
Additionally, it is found that the levels of growth rates of both, carbon footprint 
and domestic emissions, vary heavily from country to country. Apart from that, 
the trade of goods embodying emissions made up for 16% of the entire carbon 
dioxide emissions in 1995. However, in 2007, this value has increased to 21%. 
This growth began in 2002, the year when most countries ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol, being also the year of China’s entrance to the World Trade 
Organization. 
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Table 5: Per Capita Emission Levels and Carbon Trade: Initial Levels and 
Rates of Change84 
 
Analyzing the data given, Aichele and Felbermayr come to the conclusion that 
Kyoto has succeeded in reducing the domestic carbon dioxide emissions of 
some countries by 7% on average. However, this had finally no positive effect 
on global emissions because the net carbon import rate has increased by 14% 
at the same time. It is assumed that in those countries with substantial 
emissions reductions, corporations were affected by the undertaken measures 
while the population itself, which is relevant for the nation’s footprint, was not. 
This would mean that the Kyoto Protocol has rather relocated the production of 
carbon dioxide than reducing it. In addition, the authors conclude that the 
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concept of the Protocol to require only some nations to reduce their emissions 
must have led to a carbon leakage, which might not only have compensated 
emission savings but even harmed the global climate, because it has imposed 
additional costs on companies and consumers without leading to the desired 
improvements in global emission levels. The paper’s recommendations for 
future agreements are to either cover all big economies or to adjust the border 
taxes in order to make a unit of carbon dioxide equally costly wherever the 
emissions occur. 
One main criticism of the paper is the use of only a limited amount of sample 
countries. This is due to the fact that the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, which provided the data on which the analyses 
were based, had sufficient data available for only 40 countries and the time 
span from 1995 to 2007. Therefore, in order to minimize measurement errors, 
the study was restricted to this timeframe and nations. However, it would be 
desirable to also include new data for the period from 2008-2012.85 
8.2. Montreal versus Kyoto 
Even though it has proven to be challenging to come to an agreement that 
achieves high participation, abatement and compliance levels at the same time, 
there are nevertheless a few successful international treaties, even in the field 
of environmental issues. One example is the Montreal Protocol that aimed to 
reduce the usage of ozone depleting substances. The problem of the 
stratospheric ozone depletion is fairly similar to climate change. The reduction 
of the respective emissions can be characterized as global public goods for they 
are global in the sense that both, ozone depleting chemicals emissions and 
greenhouse gas emissions, occur in every country, that the entire globe is 
influenced by these emissions and that dealing with them requires a large 
amount of countries to cooperate. However, there is a crucial imbalance in the 
success of the Montreal and the Kyoto Protocol. For this reason, several 
analyses have been conducted in order to find out which were the factors that 
favored success or failure of the two treaties. 
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8.2.1. The Montreal Protocol 
The Montreal Protocol that has been signed in 1987 originated from some 
scientists’ prediction that CFC emissions could lead to a depletion of the ozone 
layer by 7%, the potential consequences being more people suffering from skin 
cancer and eye diseases as well as a productivity decrease in agriculture and 
fishery. Although these predictions were unsure and could not be proved, the 
USA along with several other countries decided to limit the amount of CFC 
being produced and used. Nevertheless, CFC emissions continued to increase 
as other countries began to increasingly make use of the chemicals and some 
growing industries, such as the one for computer chips, necessitated higher 
amounts of the chemicals than before. Therefore, in 1977, the UNEP organized 
an international conference dealing especially with the ozone layer, 
recommending negotiating a treaty that would manage the protection of the 
stratospheric ozone. This was realized in 1985 during the Vienna Convention 
with a framework that did not impose requirements on the signatories, but 
should support future negotiations. 
Short after, it was discovered that over the Antarctic, the ozone layer had 
diminished by 40% during the time from 1977 to 1985. This led quickly to the 
signature of the Montreal Protocol in 1987, which required from the signatory 
nations a reduction of CFC emissions by 50% and the stabilization of some 
halons at the levels from 1986 until 1999. The agreement entered into force on 
1 January 1989 and its 30 signatory countries covered 83% of total emissions of 
the mentioned chemicals. Because these requirements soon turned out to be 
insufficient, the Montreal Protocol was corrected in 1990. Instead of eight 
chemicals, the list was extended to 20 and instead of halving the CFC 
emissions, a complete elimination was envisioned. An additional goal was to 
include more developing countries in the agreement. To achieve this, 
industrialized nations declared their readiness to make payments to developing 
countries in order to support them with the incremental costs that would occur 
when complying with the requirements of the Protocol. Two years later, further 
adjustments were made, including 74 additional chemicals on the list, phase-out 
dates for different chemicals and most importantly, measures against non-
compliance, including systems for licensing and against illegal trade of the 
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relevant chemicals. Since then, participation to the Montreal Protocol has 
constantly risen to 197 parties. 
8.2.2. Differences between Montreal and Kyoto 
Even though the two Protocols appear to have many similarities, there are also 
some points in which they differ dramatically from one another. First of all, the 
Montreal Protocol limited the amount of emissions of the relevant chemicals for 
all counties. The Kyoto Protocol on the other hand included only limits for 
industrial countries and economies in transition, but not for developing 
countries. While both Protocols involved differentiated emission limits, those in 
the Montreal Protocol differed only from category to category whereas the Kyoto 
Protocol allowed negotiating country-specific limits as well as an adjustment of 
the base year for transition economies. Additionally, these limits were only set 
up for the period from 2008 to 2012 in case of Kyoto, in contrast to Montreal 
where the emission limits were meant as permanent restrictions. The problem 
of emission leakage that was encountered by the Kyoto agreement was avoided 
in the other Protocol through banning the import of any goods that promote 
ozone depletion. Another important factor are side payments, i.e. payments by 
industrial countries to enable developing nations to comply with the agreement, 
which was a crucial part in the Montreal Protocol but not in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Along with trade sanctions against non-participants that were stipulated in 
Montreal’s agreement, these side payments represented a fundamental 
incentive to comply. This and the perspective that goods produced with ozone-
depleting chemicals would anyway not be tradeable anymore with member 
countries to the Protocol because of the import bans against leakage is also 
considered to be the reason why this treaty was consistent against free riding. 
The Kyoto Protocol in contrast imposed no trade restrictions and had, apart 
from the minimum participation clause, weaker incentives against free riding. In 
the case of Montreal, the minimum participation was two thirds and at least 
eleven countries, withdrawal being allowed until four years after the ratification 
and giving one year’s notice. For Kyoto, 55% of Annex I’s carbon dioxide 
emissions and at least 55 ratifying countries were required with the right to 
withdraw until three years from the moment when the Protocol entered into 
force, also giving one year’s notice. 
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8.2.3. Implications 
Barrett comes to the conclusion that the success of the Montreal Protocol can 
be accredited to the extremely high levels of participation. These were achieved 
through a mixture of reward-based incentives in the form of side payments, 
which guaranteed that developing countries and economies in transition could 
not be disadvantaged by the agreement, and penalty-based incentives 
represented by trade sanctions, which together with the minimum participation 
paragraph created a situation in which not participating was unattractive for no 
matter which country. A usual problem in international agreements is that the 
incentives are not credible. In the Montreal case this was not the case due to 
the economics of ozone protection. The rewards were not only credible for 
developing countries but also for industrial nations because the benefits from 
protecting the ozone clearly outweighed the costs from complying with the 
agreement and supporting the other countries. The trade penalties on the other 
hand were credible because if they would not be used, a production relocation 
to non-signatory states would be a probable consequence that would obviously 
not be in the interest of the agreement. Barrett considered the lack of credible 
mechanisms to encourage participation to be the fundamental weakness of the 
Kyoto Protocol, as these limit the sustainable level of cooperation that can be 
expected internationally as well as the potential advantages from cooperating.86 
Sunstein on the other hand sees a main difference in the highly differing 
position of the USA concerning the two subjects, because the USA’s 
participation is considered to be a key driver in international environmental 
agreements. While the USA’s cost-benefit analysis for the reduction of ozone-
depleting substances came to the result that the Montreal Protocol was highly 
favorable to the USA and therefore was strongly supported by the government, 
the same analysis concerned with reductions in greenhouse gas emissions led 
to the conclusion that the Kyoto Protocol was unattractive and potentially 
harming to the nation and for this reason the participation was refused. The 
paper explains this by stating that for the USA, neither of the two situations is a 
prisoner’s dilemma. With regards to ozone depletion, the country would still 
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have enough incentive to comply with the framework of the Montreal Protocol if 
no other country participated. However, in case of the Kyoto Protocol, the loss 
from climate change for the USA is assumed to be relatively small compared to 
other parties such as Africa and India, whereas the US, along with China, would 
have to bear most of the costs for emission reductions.87 
Chapter Conclusion: This chapter showed that climate change 
negotiations can be approximated by a prisoner’s dilemma. 
However, a coordination game has proven to be more favorable 
on condition that the population can be shifted towards the 
efficient equilibrium. Even though there have been successful 
environmental agreements, it turned out to be quite difficult to 
change the game. First of all, because factors like uncertainty 
and reciprocity cannot be forced or controlled. Secondly, 
because mechanisms to overcome the free rider effect are hard 
to implement.  
Situation Analysis: US Quitting Paris Agreement 
Chapter Outlook: This chapter will reunite the different elements 
from climate change negotiations, the USA in climate change 
and game theory looked at before in order to understand 
reasons why Trump might have decided to quit the Paris 
Agreement in a first step. Afterwards, the consequences of a 
withdrawal for the US, other countries and the future 
development of climate change negotiations will be examined. 
 
9. Reasons for Quitting 
Why politicians take certain decisions is not always clear to the public, 
especially if underlying analyses are not published in detail. However, in case of 
Trump’s decision to quit the Paris Agreement, speculations can roughly be 
grouped into five categories.  
The first possibility is that Trump does just not believe in climate change. This 
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assumption does not sound too farfetched, as statistics have shown that only 
about one third of the US population considers climate change to be a serious 
problem. However, this consideration has been refuted by the US Ambassador 
Haley, stating that Trump believed that the climate was changing and that 
pollutants were part of the equation88 . 
Therefore, another explanation could be that Trump has another payoff 
valuation than Obama for example. This would mean that he acknowledges the 
science of climate change but considers the investments and efforts required 
from the US as more costly than the future cost of climate change. This 
assumption is supported by Trump’s statement on the Paris climate accord, in 
which he refers to a study of the National Economic Research Associates that 
estimated that compliance with the agreement would cost the country almost $3 
trillion of GDP and therefore concludes that this burden would put the country in 
an uncompetitive position and create less benefit for the US than for other 
countries89. However, the Stern Review, a frequently cited work on the 
economics of climate change, comes to the conclusion that, if countries act 
immediately and to a sufficient extent, this would be beneficial to all countries, 
as the findings suggest that the costs of acting could be limited to approximately 
1% of global GDP per year, while not acting could cost as much as 5% - 20% of 
global GDP, depending on the impacts of climate change. Even though these 
are anticipated to affect many developing countries stronger than industrial 
nations, the review emphasizes that every single country will suffer from global 
warming.90 Nevertheless, from a game theoretic point of view, the high degree 
of uncertainty connected to the climate change issue speaks in favor of this 
explanation, as the payoff valuation does highly depend on the information 
available to the parties, their rationalities, as well as on their personal beliefs 
and reservations.  
A third explanation can also be found in the same statement of Trump’s, in 
which he denotes the US would remain the most environmentally friendly 
country in the world, independent of its commitment or withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement. If this was true, game theory suggests that the withdrawal 
should not make a big difference if the USA’s efforts were still visible to other 
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countries. Yet, Trump’s plans to cancel carbon dioxide emissions reductions 
and other climate related regulations91 might raise doubts how this should be 
manageable. 
Finally, Trump might envision minimizing the USA’s financial contributions and 
retaining a high degree of flexibility while free riding on the efforts of others. This 
could on the one hand be the other countries that still fulfill their parts, which 
represents a fourth explanation. This would mean that the Trump administration 
is convinced that the other countries will manage to avert catastrophic 
consequences from global warming without the support of the US. 
On the other hand, the explanation might be a free riding effect on future 
generations. This would mean that the administration was consciously 
accepting that future generations would suffer from global climate change 
because the current generations were not willing to abstain from the benefits of 
exploitation, which ultimately describes the tragedy of the commons and leads 
back to the prisoner’s dilemma.  
 
10. Consequences 
For the US, there would most probably be beneficial short-term consequences 
as the country could free ride on other nation’s efforts and elaborate a 
competitive advantage compared to the other countries that choose to commit 
to climate protection. Therewith, additional economic benefits could be created. 
Nevertheless, this behavior could in the long run undermine the beneficial 
impacts of the agreement, especially if the theory of a climate tipping point 
turned out to be true and the world did not succeed in avoiding the threshold 
because of lacking commitment from the USA. The scientific impacts of climate 
change would also hit the US. Figure 13 shows a map of worldwide carbon 
dioxide emissions in 2015. The size of the dots is proportional to the nation’s 
carbon emissions and the black color indicates that the nation is a signatory of 
the Paris Agreement, while the red color is used for those countries that have 
not signed or plan to withdraw. 
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Figure 13: Global CO2 Emissions of Countries in and out of the Paris 
Agreement92 
 
As can be seen, a withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement could have a 
huge effect on the success of the agreement, as those of Nicaragua and Syria 
are almost negligible and the rest of the world has signed. Knowing that the US 
has a crucial position in climate change negotiations, the threat is that other 
countries might change their strategy as a response to the USA’s decision. 
It is clear that if the climate game was a pure prisoner’s dilemma, the withdrawal 
should not make a change, as all countries should limit their efforts to what is 
absolutely necessary. On the other hand, if the climate game was a pure 
coordination game, the withdrawal should have a fundamental impact on 
climate change negotiations, because the efficient equilibrium is only beneficial 
to all parties if a vast majority opts for it. This could be endangered if such an 
important role model takes back its commitment. Although the other G20 parties 
announced to still adhere to their pledges93, it can be assumed that the 
withdrawal of the second largest emitter of carbon dioxide might leave smaller 
countries discouraged questioning the worthiness of their efforts.  
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Another possibility is that this motivates the other countries to endeavor even 
more in order to compensate for the losses in progress due to the USA’s 
withdrawal. However, even though some US states are trying to absorb the 
losses, it might proof not very plausible that other countries are willing to commit 
even more.  
A further possibility could be that some countries start individually imposing 
trade restrictions on the US in order to punish the nation for not participating in 
the Paris Agreement. However, it could be expected that the US would then in 
its turn impose taxes. Therefore, this would only be an option for countries that 
do not depend on exports and imports from the US or that it can substitute 
these transactions, for example through trade treaties with other states. This, 
however, would depict that the Paris Agreement lacks a mechanism to prevent 
countries from free riding, such as a climate club or a linear compensation 
mechanism. Implementing such a mechanism has been found to be challenging 
for a group of negotiating nations. Yet, for single countries, this appears to be 
almost impossible without strong alliances.  
One final possibility is that countries play some kind of reciprocity strategy. This 
would mean that a withdrawal of the USA could encourage countries to restraint 
from ratifying the agreement or to just not meet the pledges. In a broader sense, 
this implies that a withdrawal, or even the already made announcement, could 
destroy the trust between the parties. For it takes several years to see whether 
the other nations hold on to their pledges, it might be that parties now take an 
even more conservative approach to investing in climate protection. This could 
in total lead to a slowdown in a process in which a strong acceleration would be 
needed. 
Chapter Summary: From this chapter it can be concluded that 
Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement was 
most probably due to a strong incentive to free ride or due to a 
payoff valuation different from Obama’s. However, the 
assessment of the exact consequences for the US, other 
countries and the future development of climate change 
negotiations cannot be finalized outright. 
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Conclusion 
Although several explanations for the USA’s decision can be found, the most 
probable being free riding incentives or a change in the payoff valuation, most 
game theorists would probably say that a withdrawal of the USA from the Paris 
Agreement should not have a huge impact on climate change. Not because 
they believe that the actions of a single country, even as big as the US, had too 
little influence, but because they argue that the Paris Agreement, just like its 
predecessors, should not have much impact on global warming. This is 
because international agreements do usually not manage to achieve high 
participation, high compliance levels and ambitious requirements at the same 
time94. This also applies to the Paris Agreement. Apart from the fact that 
scientists point out that the requirements will probably be too low to effectively 
tackle the problem of climate change, at least if the countries’ pledges are not 
significantly tightened every five years, especially in the face of a possible 
threatening tipping point, the USA’s plan to withdraw from the agreement 
proves that it lacks a mechanism to enforce participation. Additionally, it cannot 
yet be assessed whether the signatory states will comply with all of their 
pledges. Nevertheless, as there is no chance to observe the counterfactual, it 
cannot be definitively evaluated whether this is true or whether the world would 
do significantly worse without the agreement. 
The game theoretic findings presented in this thesis suggest that, as long as the 
climate game can closest be modelled as a prisoner’s dilemma, the success of 
the Paris Agreement should be unaffected by a withdrawal from the US. 
However, if any factors, such as new scientific insights that give more certainty 
about the dangerous threshold of temperature warming, will shift the game 
towards a coordination game at some point in time, a withdrawal of an important 
player could make it hard to convince other countries to opt for the efficient 
equilibrium, i.e. strongly acting against climate change. 
Increasing the efficiency of the Paris Agreement through mechanisms like 
climate clubs, which could be done with the help of supplementary regulations 
or treaties, would also be rendered substantially more difficult if the USA quitted 
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the agreement. This is due to the fact that the US is one of the leading 
economies in the world and requiring countries inside the Paris Agreement to 
impose taxes and in turn also accept taxes imposed by the US, seems rather 
impossible. 
Still, as Trump emphasized the USA were disadvantaged and weakened by the 
Paris Agreement compared to other nations like China that could benefit from it, 
it might be concluded that he is afraid of other countries free riding on the USA’s 
efforts. This fear, however, could effectively be eliminated through a mechanism 
like linear compensation. Implementing such a mechanism could help make the 
agreement to be perceived as fair and safe against free riding from other 
countries. This could possibly increase the countries willingness to adhere to 
the agreement and put in efforts. Therefore, this could also prevent the US from 
ultimately quitting the Paris Agreement. 
The last game theoretic aspect to be highlighted in this context is the concept of 
reciprocity. Even though other countries will most likely not react to a withdrawal 
of the US by actively choosing a reciprocity strategy like tit for tat, the most 
plausible threat of this event might be that the trust between the countries gets 
lost and makes other nations feel unsure about their efforts and react, 
consciously or unconsciously, by reducing them. This could, in the worst case, 
lead to a global slowdown in climate protection. 
To sum it all up, it can be concluded that from a game theoretic point of view, 
although many variables are still unclear, there is a chance that a withdrawal of 
the US from the Paris Agreement could have some effect on the future of 
climate protection. However, further research would be required in order to 
assess the extent to which countries react to the decisions of other countries 
and which variables most influence their reactions. For example, it could be 
investigated whether poor countries are more impressed by actions of the US 
than rich ones and therefore react stronger or whether those countries that will 
be least affected by climate change are more responsive to the example given 
by the US than those that are strongly affected. Another interesting question to 
be examined is whether the announcement of the other G20 nations to 
consequently stick to their commitments could compensate for the withdrawal of 
the US. Finally, it has to be pointed out that, although game theory can help to 
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gain new insights into the topic of climate change negotiations, other tools and 
approaches should be considered as well. 
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Annex 
Matrix 1 (Breakdown: The Climate Game, Payoffs Prisoner’s Dilemma) 
  Rest of the World 
  Act Exploit 
Single 
Country 
Act Risk: 0 
Cost: -1 
Benefit: 0 
Sum: -1 
Risk: -3 
Cost: -1 
Benefit: 0 
Sum: -4 
Exploit Risk: 0 
Cost: 0 
Benefit: 1 
Sum: 1 
Risk: -3 
Cost: 0 
Benefit: 1 
Sum: -2 
 
Matrix 2 (Breakdown: The Climate Game, Stag Hunt) 
  Rest of the World 
  Act Exploit 
Single 
Country 
Act Risk: 0, 0 
Cost: -3, -3 
Benefit: 0, 0 
Sum: -3, -3 
Risk: -6, -6 
Cost: -3, 0 
Benefit: 0, 1 
Sum: -9, -5 
Exploit Risk: -6, -6 
Cost: 0, -3 
Benefit: 1, 0 
Sum: -5, -9 
Risk: -6, -6 
Cost: 0, 0 
Benefit: 1, 1 
Sum: -5, -5 
 
Matrix 3 (Breakdown: Initial Payoff Matrix Modified) 
  Rest of the World 
  Act Exploit 
Single 
Country 
Act Risk: 0 
Cost: -1 
Benefit: 0 
Compensation: 0 
Sum: -1 
Risk: -3 
Cost: -1 
Benefit: 0 
Compensation: 0 
Sum: -4 
Exploit Risk: 0 
Cost: 0 
Benefit: 1 
Compensation: -3 
Sum: -2 
Risk: -3 
Cost: 0 
Benefit: 1 
Compensation: 0 
Sum: -2 
 
 
